The Use and Abuse of History

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Book by Friedrich Nietzsche - The Use and Abuse of History, page 3

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advance that he will be condemned, not in spite of but just because his judges have solemnly proclaimed the canon of

monumental culture (that is, in accordance with the given explanation, culture which in all ages "has had effects").
Whereas, for the judges everything which is not yet monumental, because it is contemporary, lacks, first, the need for
history, second, the clear inclination toward history, and third, the very authority of history. On the other hand, their instinct
tells them that culture can be struck dead by culture. The monumental is definitely not to rise up once more. And for that

their instinct uses precisely what has the authority of the monumental from the past.
So they are knowledgeable about culture because they generally like to get rid of culture. They behave as if they were
doctors, while basically they are only concerned with mixing poisons. Thus, they develop their languages and their taste, in
order to explain in their discriminating way why they so persistently disapprove of all offerings of more nourishing cultural
food. For they do not want greatness to arise. Their method is to say: "See greatness is already there!" In truth, this

greatness that is already there is of as little concern to them as what arises out of it. Of that their life bears witness.
Monumental history is the theatrical costume in which they pretend that their hate for the powerful and the great of their
time is a fulfilling admiration for the strong and the great of past times. In this, through disguise they invert the real sense of
that method of historical observation into its opposite. Whether they know it or not, they certainly act as if their motto were:

let the dead bury the living.
Each of the three existing types of history is only exactly right for a single area and a single climate; on every other one it
grows up into a destructive weed. If a man who wants to create greatness uses the past, then he will empower himself
through monumental history. On the other hand, the man who wishes to emphasize the customary and traditionally valued

cultivates the past as an antiquarian historian. Only the man whose breast is oppressed by a present need and who wants
to cast off his load at any price has a need for critical history, that is, history which sits in judgment and passes judgment.
From the thoughtless transplanting of plants stem many ills: the critical man without need, the antiquarian without
reverence, and the student of greatness without the ability for greatness are the sort who are receptive to weeds estranged
from their natural mother earth and therefore degenerate growths.


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History belongs secondly to the man who preserves and honours, to the person who with faith and love looks back in the

direction from which he has come, where he has been. Through this reverence he, as it were, gives thanks for his
existence. While he nurtures with a gentle hand what has stood from time immemorial, he want to preserve the conditions
under which he came into existence for those who are to come after him. And so he serves life. His possession of his
ancestors' goods changes the ideas in such a soul, for those goods are far more likely to take possession of his soul. The

small, limited, crumbling, and archaic keep their own worth and integrity, because the conserving and honouring soul of
the antiquarian man settles on these things and there prepares for itself a secret nest. The history of his city becomes for
him the history of his own self. He understands the walls, the turreted gate, the dictate of the city council, and the folk
festival, like an illustrated diary of his youth, and he rediscovers for himself in all this his force, his purpose, his passion, his

opinion, his foolishness, and his bad habits. He says to himself, here one could live, for here one may live, and here one
can go on living, because we endure and do not collapse overnight. Thus, with this "We" he looks back over the past
amazing lives of individuals and feels himself like the spirit of the house, the generation, and the city. From time to time he
personally greets from the far away, obscure, and confused centuries the soul of a people as his own soul, with a feeling of
completion and premonition, a scent of almost lost tracks, an instinctively correct reading even of a past which has been

written over, a swift understanding of the erased and reused parchments (which have, in fact, been erased and written over
many times). These are his gifts and his virtues. With them stands Goethe in front of the memorial to Erwin von Steinbach.
In the storm of his feeling the veil of the historical cloud spread out between them was torn apart. He saw the German work
for the first time once more, "working from the strong rough German soul."

Such a sense and attraction led the Italians of the Renaissance and reawoke in their poets the old Italian genius, to a
"wonderfully renewed sound of the ancient lyre," as Jakob Burckhardt says. But that antiquarian historical sense of
reverence has the highest value when it infuses into the modest, raw, even meagre conditions in which an individual or a
people live a simple moving feeling of pleasure and satisfaction, in the way, for example, Niebuhr admitted with honest

sincerity he could live happily on moor and heath among free farmers who had a history, without missing art. How could
history better serve living than by the fact that it thus links the less favoured races and people to their home region and
home traditions, keeps them settled there, and prevents them from roaming around and from competition and warfare,
looking for something better in foreign places?
Sometimes it seems as if it is an obstinate lack of understanding which keeps individuals, as it were, screwed tight to these

companions and surroundings, to this arduous daily routine, to these bare mountain ridges, but it is the most healthy lack of
understanding, the most beneficial to the community, as anyone knows who has clearly experienced the frightening effects
of an adventurous desire to wander away, sometimes even among entire hordes of people, or who sees nearby the
condition of a people which has lost faith in its ancient history and has fallen into a restless cosmopolitan choice and a

constant search for novelty after novelty. The opposite feeling, the sense of well being of a tree for its roots, the happiness
to know oneself in a manner not entirely arbitrary and accidental, but as someone who has grown out of a past, as an heir,
flower, and fruit, and thus to have one's existence excused, indeed justified, this is what people nowadays lovingly
describe as the real historical sense.

Now, that is naturally not the condition in which a person would be most capable of dissolving the past into pure
knowledge. Thus, also we perceive here what we discerned in connection with monumental history, that the past itself
suffers, so long as history serves life and is ruled by the drive to live. To speak with some freedom in the illustration, the
tree feels its roots more than it can see them. The extent of this feeling, however, is measured by the size and force of its
visible branches. If the tree makes a mistake here, then how mistaken it will be about the entire forest around it! From that

forest the tree only knows and feels something insofar as this hinders or helps it, but not otherwise. The antiquarian sense
of a person, a civic community, an entire people always has a very highly restricted field of vision. It does not perceive
most things at all, and the few things which it does perceive it looks at far too closely and in isolation. It cannot measure it
and therefore takes everything as equally important. Thus, for the antiquarian sense each single thing is too important. For

it assigns to the things of the past no difference in value and proportion which would distinguish things from each other
fairly, but measures things by the proportions of the antiquarian individual or people looking back into the past.
Here there is always the imminent danger that at some point everything old and past, especially what still enters a
particular field of vision, is taken as equally worthy of reverence but that everything which does not fit this respect for

ancient things, like the new and the coming into being, is rejected and treated as hostile. So even the Greeks tolerated the
hieratic style of their plastic arts alongside the free and the great styles, indeed, they not only tolerated later the pointed
noses and the frosty smiles, but made them into an elegant fashion. When the sense of a people is hardened like this, when
history serves the life of the past in such a way that it buries further living, especially higher living, when the historical
sense no longer conserves life, but mummifies it, then the tree dies unnaturally, from the top gradually down to the roots,

and at last the roots themselves are generally destroyed. Antiquarian history itself degenerates in that moment when it no
longer inspires and fills with enthusiasm the fresh life of the present. Then reverence withers away. The scholarly habit
lives on without it and orbits in an egotistical and self-satisfied manner around its own centre. Then we get a glimpse of the
wretched drama of a blind mania for collecting, a restless compiling together of everything that ever existed. The man

envelops himself in a mouldy smell. With the antiquarian style, he manages to corrupt a significant talent, a noble need,
into an insatiable new lust, a desire for everything really old. Often he sinks so deep that he is finally satisfied with that
nourishment and takes pleasure in gobbling up for himself the dust of biographical quisquilien [rubbish].
But even when this degeneration does not enter into it, when antiquarian history does not lose the basis upon which it

alone can take root as a cure for living, enough dangers still remain, especially if it becomes too powerful and grows over
the other ways of dealing with the past. Antiquarian history knows only how to preserve life, not how to generate it.
Therefore, it always undervalues what is coming into being, because it has no instinctive feel for it, as, for example,
monumental history has. Thus, antiquarian history hinders the powerful willing of new things; it cripples the active man,
who always, as an active person, will and must set aside reverence to some extent. The fact that something has become

old now gives birth to the demand that it must be immortal, for when a man reckons what every such ancient fact, an old
custom of his fathers, a religious belief, an inherited political right, has undergone throughout its existence, what sum of
reverence and admiration from individuals and generations ever since, then it seems presumptuous or even criminal to
replace such an antiquity with something new and to set up in opposition to such a numerous cluster of revered and
admired things the single fact of what is coming into being and what is present.

method of analyzing the past is quite often necessary for human beings, alongside the monumental and the antiquarian:
the critical method. Once again this is in the service of living. A person must have the power and from time to time use it to
break a past and to dissolve it, in order to be able to live. He manages to do this by dragging the past before the court of
justice, investigating it meticulously, and finally condemning it. That past is worthy of condemnation; for that is how it

stands with human things: in them human force and weakness have always been strong. Here it is not righteousness which
sits in the judgment seat or, even less, mercy which announces judgment, but life alone, that dark, driving, insatiable
self-desiring force. Its judgment is always unmerciful, always unjust, because it never emerges from a pure spring of
knowledge, but in most cases the judgment would be like that anyway, even if righteousness itself were to utter it. "For

everything that arises is worth destroying. Therefore, it would be better that nothing arose." It requires a great deal of
power to be able to live and to forget just how much life and being unjust are one and the same. Luther himself once
voiced the opinion that the world only came into being through the forgetfulness of God; if God had thought about "heavy
artillery," he would never have made the world. From time to time, however, this same life, which uses forgetting,
demands the temporary destruction of this forgetfulness. For it should be made quite clear how unjust the existence of

something or other is, a right, a caste, a dynasty, for example, and how this thing merits destruction.
For when its past is analyzed critically, then we grasp with a knife at its roots and go cruelly beyond all reverence. It is
always a dangerous process, that is, a dangerous process for life itself. And people or ages serving life in this way, by
judging and destroying a past, are always dangerous and in danger. For since we are now the products of earlier

generations, we are also the products of their aberrations, passions, mistakes, and even crimes. It is impossible to loose
oneself from this chain entirely. When we condemn that confusion and consider ourselves released from it, then we have
not overcome the fact that we are derived from it. In the best case, we bring the matter to a conflict between our inherited
customary nature and our knowledge, in fact, even to a war between a new strict discipline and how we have been

brought up and what we have inherited from time immemorial. We cultivate a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature,
so that the first nature atrophies. It is an attempt to give oneself, as it were, a past a posteriori [after the fact], out of which
we may be descended in opposition to the one from which we are descended. It is always a dangerous attempt, because it
is so difficult to find a borderline to the denial of the past and because the second nature usually is weaker than the first.
Too often what remains is a case of someone who understands the good without doing it, because we also understand

what is better without being able to do it. But here and there victory is nevertheless achieved, and for the combatants, for
those who make use of critical history for their own living, there is even a remarkable consolation, namely, they know that
that first nature was at one time or another once a second nature and that every victorious second nature becomes a first
nature.






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These are the services which history can carry out for living. Every person and every people, according to its goals, forces,
and needs, uses a certain knowledge of the past, sometimes as monumental history, sometimes as antiquarian history, and
sometimes as critical history, but not as a crowd of pure thinkers only watching life closely, not as people eager for
knowledge, individuals only satisfied by knowledge, for whom an increase of understanding is the only goal, but always

only for the purpose of living and, in addition, under the command and the highest guidance of this life. This is the natural
relationship to history of an age, a culture, and a people: summoned up by hunger, regulated by the degree of the need,
held to limits by the plastic power within, the understanding of the past is desired at all times to serve the future and the
present, not to weaken the present, not to uproot a forceful living future. That all is simple, as the truth is simple, and is also

immediately convincing for anyone who does not begin by letting himself be guided by historical proof.
And now for a quick look at our time! We are frightened and run back. Where is all the clarity, all the naturalness and
purity of that connection between life and history? How confusedly, excessively, and anxiously this problem now streams
before our eyes! Does the fault lie with us, the observers? Or has the constellation of life and history altered, because a
powerful and hostile star has interposed itself between them? Other people might point out that we have seen things

incorrectly, but we want to state what we think we see. In any case, such a star has come in between, an illuminating and
beautiful star. The constellation has truly changed through science, through the demand that history is to be a science. Now
not only does life no longer rule and control knowledge about the past, but also all the border markings have been ripped
up, and everything that used to exist has come crashing down onto people. As far back as there has been a coming into

being, far back into the endless depths, all perspectives have also shifted. No generation ever saw such an immense
spectacle as is shown now by the science of universal becoming, by history. Of course, history even shows this with the
dangerous boldness of its motto: Fiat veritas, pereat vita [let the truth be done and let life perish].
Let us picture to ourselves the spiritual result produced by this process in the soul of the modern man. Historical knowledge

streams out of invincible sources always renewing itself with more. Strange and disconnected things push forward. Memory
opens all its gates and is nevertheless not open wide enough. Nature strives its utmost to receive these strange guests, to
arrange and honour them. But these are at war with each other, and it appears necessary to overcome them forcibly, in
order not to destroy oneself in their conflict. Habituation to such a disorderly, stormy, and warring household gradually
becomes a second nature, although it is immediately beyond question that this second nature is much weaker, much more

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