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Then shall we say that the one, being in this relation to the
not-one, is the same with it?
Let us say so.
Then it is the same with itself and the others, and also other
than itself and the others.
That appears to be the inference. And it will also be like and
unlike itself and the others?
Since the one was shown to be other than the others, the others will
also be other than the one.
And the one is other than the others in the same degree that the
others are other than it, and neither more nor less?
And if neither more nor less, then in a like degree?
In virtue of the affection by which the one is other than others and
others in like manner other than it, the one will be affected like the
others and the others like the one.
How do you mean?
I may take as an illustration the case of names: You give a name
to a thing?
And you may say the name once or oftener?
And when you say it once, you mention that of which it is the
name? and when more than once, is it something else which you mention?
or must it always be the same thing of which you speak, whether you
utter the name once or more than once?
Of course it is the same.
And is not "other" a name given to a thing?
Whenever, then, you use the word "other," whether once or oftener,
you name that of which it is the name, and to no other do you give the
Then when we say that the others are other than the one, and the one
other than the others, in repeating the word "other" we speak of
that nature to which the name is applied, and of no other?
Then the one which is other than others, and the other which is
other than the one, in that the word "other" is applied to both,
will be in the same condition; and that which is in the same condition
Then in virtue of the affection by which the one is other than the
others, every thing will be like every thing, for every thing is other
than every thing.
Again, the like is opposed to the unlike?
And the other to the same?
And the one was also shown to be the same with the others?
And to be, the same with the others is the opposite of being other
than the others?
And in that it was other it was shown to be like?
But in that it was the same it will be unlike by virtue of the
opposite affection to that which made it and this was the affection of
The same then will make it unlike; otherwise it will not be the
opposite of the other.
Then the one will be both like and unlike the others; like in so far
as it is other, and unlike in so far as it is the same.
Yes, that argument may be used.
And there is another argument.
In so far as it is affected in the same way it is not affected
otherwise, and not being affected otherwise is not unlike, and not
being unlike, is like; but in so far as it is affected by other it
is otherwise, and being otherwise affected is unlike.
Then because the one is the same with the others and other than
the others, on either of these two grounds, or on both of them, it
will be both like and unlike the others?
And in the same way as being other than itself, and the same with
itself on either of these two grounds and on both of them, it will
be like and unlike itself.
Again, how far can the one touch or not touch itself and
I am considering.
The one was shown to be in itself which was a whole?
And also in other things?
In so far as it is in other things it would touch other things,
but in so far as it is in itself it would be debarred from touching
them, and would touch itself only.
Then the inference is that it would touch both?
But what do you say to a new point of view? Must not that which is