Parmenides

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Book by Plato - Parmenides, page 22

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Then we must say that the one which is not never stands still and

never moves?

Neither.

Nor is there any existing thing which can be attributed to it; for

if there had been, it would partake of being?

That is clear.

And therefore neither smallness, nor greatness, nor equality, can be

attributed to it?

No.

Nor yet likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or

to others?

Clearly not.

Well, and if nothing should be attributed to it, can other things be

attributed to it?

Certainly not.

And therefore other things can neither be like or unlike, the

same, or different in relation to it?

They cannot.

Nor can what is not, be anything, or be this thing, or be related to

or the attribute of this or that or other, or be past, present, or

future. Nor can knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or expression,

or name, or any other thing that is, have any concern with it?

No.

Then the one that is not has no condition of any kind?

Such appears to be the conclusion.

Yet once more; if one is not, what becomes of the others? Let us

determine that.

Yes; let us determine that.

The others must surely be; for if they, like the one, were not, we

could not be now speaking of them.

True.

But to speak of the others implies difference-the terms "other"

and "different" are synonymous?

True.

Other means other than other, and different, different from the

different?

Yes.

Then, if there are to be others, there is something than which

they will be other?

Certainly.

And what can that be?-for if the one is not, they will not be

other than the one.

They will not.

Then they will be other than each other; for the only remaining

alternative is that they are other than nothing.

True.

And they are each other than one another, as being plural and not

singular; for if one is not, they cannot be singular but every

particle of them is infinite in number; and even if a person takes

that which appears to be the smallest fraction, this, which seemed

one, in a moment evanesces into many, as in a dream, and from being

the smallest becomes very great, in comparison with the fractions into

which it is split up?

Very true.

And in such particles the others will be other than one another,

if others are, and the one is not?

Exactly.

And will there not be many particles, each appearing to be one,

but not being one, if one is not?

True.

And it would seem that number can be predicated of them if each of

them appears to be one, though it is really many?

It can.

And there will seem to be odd and even among them, which will also

have no reality, if one is not?

Yes.

And there will appear to be a least among them; and even this will

seem large and manifold in comparison with the many small fractions

which are contained in it?

Certainly.

And each particle will be imagined to be equal to the many and

little; for it could not have appeared to pass from the greater to the

less without having appeared to arrive at the middle; and thus would

arise the appearance of equality.

Yes.

And having neither beginning, middle, nor end, each separate

particle yet appears to have a limit in relation to itself and other.

How so?

Because, when a person conceives of any one of these as such,

prior to the beginning another beginning appears, and there is another

end, remaining after the end, and in the middle truer middles within

but smaller, because no unity can be conceived of any of them, since

the one is not.

Very true.

And so all being, whatever we think of, must be broken up into

fractions, for a particle will have to be conceived of without unity?

Certainly.

And such being when seen indistinctly and at a distance, appears

to be one; but when seen near and with keen intellect, every single

thing appears to be infinite, since it is deprived of the one, which

is not?

Nothing more certain.

Then each of the others must appear to be infinite and finite, and

one and many, if others than the one exist and not the one.

They must.

Then will they not appear to be like and unlike?

In what way?

Just as in a picture things appear to be all one to a person

standing at a distance, and to be in the same state and alike?

True.

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   Tuesday 18 June, 2013